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Justice Clark, the Voice of the Past, and the
Exclusionary Rule
Paul R. Baier*
Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the
F_ourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the
�1ght to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers
1�, therefore, �onstitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that
nght to remam an empty promise.
-Justice Tom Clark, Mapp v. Ohio.**
The voice of the past, we are told, matters to the present. "History
can

help people see how they stand, and where they should go."'
Shortly before he died, Justice Tom Clark met with my Supreme

Court seminar students in the East Conference Room of the Supreme
Court. We were a small seminar-the Justice and a busload of young
people, with their teacher, on a field trip to the Court. When asked what
was the most difficult thing about being on the Supreme Court, Justice
Clark told us, "Well, I suppose all the hullabaloo they make over you. "2
The conversation turned to Mapp

v.

Ohio, to the exclusionary rule,

Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University; Judicial Fellow,
*
United States Supreme Court, 1975-76. I should like to thank Yale Kamisar for suggesting that I
make Justice Clark's comments on Mapp v. Ohio widely available to the community of constitutional
scholars .
** 367 U. S. 643, 6 60 (19 6 1), overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949). Justice Clark
advanced the thoughts of earlier Justices, including Justice Joseph Bradley, in Boyd v. United States,
"[C]onstitutional provisions for the security of person and property

116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886):

should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy,
and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance."
Similarly, Justice Holmes had written in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
385, 391-92 (1920):
The proposition could not be presented more nakedly. It is that although of course its
seizure was an outrage which the Government now regrets, it may study the papers before
it returns them, copy them, and then may use the knowledge that it has gained . . .. In our
opinion such is not the law. It reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of words.
And Chief Justice Hughes, in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 722 (1931), wrote that if prior
restraint of publication were permitted, "the constitutional protection [ofliberty of the press] would
be reduced to a mere form of words."
I.

P. THOMPSON, THE VOICE OF THE PAST, ORAL H I STORY 225-26 (1978):

!

[T]he real justification of history is not in giving an mmortality to a f � w of the old. It is
part of the way in which the living understand their place and part m the world . . - .
,
[H]istory can help people to see how they stand, and w ere they sh?uld go. . . . And m
giving a past, it also helps them towards a future of their own makmg.
.
2. Interview with Tom C. Clark, Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the Umted

�

C:

�

States, in Washington, D.C. (May 3, 1977) (recorded with the permission �f Justice lark) hereinaf
ter cited as Interview]. All quotations in text are from the sound recordmg of the mterv1ew.
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and to the role of judicial heroes in giving shape to our law. "I don't
know about Mapp being my most important opinion, the one I'm most
proud of. I am proud of it, because the idea of Mapp just shocked me."3
Justice Clark explained why:
When I was a kid I came out of the University of Texas Law
School.[4] I went back to Dallas and tried to practice a little law
and picked up a few cases and one of them was our cook's. We
had a cook-believe it or not-for seven dollars a week. We paid
her a dollar a day. That was the going wage for cooks. Her son
was a nice little fellow but got into trouble. They found a half-pint
of corn whiskey, during prohibition, in his house he had on Elm
Street. And they cut open the mattress; they didn't have a search
warrant or anything; they just took a knife and cut the mattresses
open, took crow bars and pulled the baseboards away from the
wall-just a terrible thing for these police officers to do. Then they
carried the half-a-pint on a "silver platter," as they called it, over
to the federal court, not to the state court, or the city court, but to
the federal court.
And so I filed a motion to quash. And Judge Atwell,[5] who
was the judge, said, "Aren't you familiar with such-and-such
case?" And I said "No." He said, "Well, that's one of my cases.
Mr. Clerk, take Mr. Clark back there in my chambers and show
him Atwell No. 7." I found out he had bound his opinions in
Atwell 1, Atwell 2, Atwell 3 [laughing]-just like the U.S.
Supreme Court does. And there was an opinion that said the fed
eral courts would receive the proceeds of an illegal search which
was made by state officers or city officers, because the federals had
no control over those officers, and it would be an untoward thing
for a person to go free just because of some technicality.[6] [Thus,]

3. Justice C lark's reaction was not initially shared by all members of the Court. As Justice
Potter Stewart has written:
I
_ was shocke? when Justice Clark's proposed Court opinion reached my desk. I im
!11ediat�l y wrote him a not � expressing m y surprise and questioning the wisdom of overr ul
.
mg an important doctrme
m a case in which the issue was not briefed, argued, or discu ssed
by the state courts, by the parties' counsel, or at our conference following the oral
argument.

?

S� ewart, The Road to Mapp v. hio and Beyond: The
Origins, Development and Future of the Exclu
si?nary
�le Ill Search-and-Seizur e Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1368 (1983). Justice Stew art
did not JOtn the Mapp opinion because of its activist
approach in deciding an issue not before the
C?urt. Ye rs la!er, however, he acknowledged
� .
that it is "perhaps the most important search-and·
_
seizure dec1s10n m .history
, 1'd
and agreed with
· neces·
·
ry rule 1s
its
·
·
conclus10n
that the exclusiona
·
sary to keep the nght of pr'ivacy secure
.
emptY
an
·
d
m[mg]
b y the fourth amendment from 'rema ·
.
, ,,
promise.
Id. at 1389 (emphasis in original).
4·
L.B., 1922; admitted to Texas
and Texas Supreme Court bars 1922· District Attorney,
'
D 11as
unty, T exas, 1927-32; Attorney
General, United States 1945-49'· Asso iate Justice, United
S tes supreme C ourt 1949 67 Di
- .
ed J u n e 13 , 197 7. BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE FED
ERAL J U DICIARY 50
976).
5. William Haw ley At weII ,
eII
U m· ted s tates Dtstnct
fi
·
·
Court, N.D. Tex., 19 24-61. Judge Atw
died December 22 196 1' our
months before Mapp v. Ohio was decided
.
_
6 See' e.g., In re Guzzard1, 84
F. Supp. 294, 295 (N.D. Tex. 1949) (Atwell, CJ.) ("Any

�

"

�

"

c!'

'

d

'

·
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�

•

Justice Tom C. Clark

th � Silver Pl':ltter Doctrine-the idea being that the waiter carries
thmgs on a �ilver platter from the kitchen to the dining room, and
.
so you earned this whiskey on a "silver platter" from the police
department over to the federal court. Potter Stewart knocked that
down in that case(7] just before Mapp.s
Young lawyer Clark's experience with blatant violations such as this
makes Justice Clark's later concern with strong fourth amendment pro
tection easy to understand.
It has been said by one who knew him well that Tom Clark "be
lieved in personal growth. There was a determination to grow."9 On the
elevator at the Court, after discussing the Mapp case at conference, Tom
Clark

turned

to

Hugo

Black

and

William

Brennan

and

asked,

"[W]ouldn't this be a good case to apply the exclusionary rule and· do
what

Wolf didn't

do?" 10

The answer, of c ourse, was in the affirmative.
landmark opinion in Mapp

v.

Ohio

Justice Clark's

infused the fourth amendment w ith

the powerful remedy o f the exclusionary rule and extended the Weeks
rule11 to the states. Ju stice Clark's personal papers, including the Mapp
files, 12 shed new light on the judicial evolution culminating in Mapp

v.

Ohio. They show him to be a keen student of the fourth amendment.
Detailed memoranda, written in longhand, reflect Tom Clark's determi
nation to reach an informed decision, in large part through his own re
search. Seventeen pages of handwritten notes13 evidence his difficult
judicial task: first t o understand, then to judge "the competing interests
of the social need that crime be repressed ... against the ignoble example
of police lawlessly invading the security of the privacy of the people, in
utter defiance of a constitutional mandate 'second to none in the Bill of

evidence secured through unlawful search and seizure by state officers not acting directly, or indi·

rectly, in behalf of the United States is admissible in a prosecution in the national courts."); accord
W. ATWELL, ATWELL'S FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE WITH PRACTICE HELPS 30

(5th ed. 1943) ("The Federal Government could use evidence secured by state officers on invalid
search if the Federa l officers had no part in the search.").
7. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).

8. Interview, supra note 2 (footnotes supplied).
School
9. R. Clark, Remarks at the Opening of the Tom C. Clark Papers, University of Texas
of Law (March 19, 1985).
10.
11.

B. SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF 393 (1983).
courts
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (applying exclusionary rule to federal

and officers).

�

·

5, at p�oce� dmgs
The Tom C. Clark Papers were opened to the public on March 19, 19
held at the University of Texas School of Law. The Papers are housed in the S !'ectal Archives m the
_
Tarlton Law Library at the University of Texas School of Law [hereinafter c1 ted as
_
his folder contains the
7.
No.
15,
Folder
l
A
13.
supra note 12, Mapp case file, Box
_
first handwritten draft of the opening pages of the Mapp op1mon and two detailed memoranda which
_
ourt ec1s1ons. These n otes
trace the origin and development of the exclusionary rule in Suprem�
_ _
_
and spmt.
reveal the working techniques of Tom Clark and are a window to hts mqumng mmd
12.

�

Archives,

�

Archive�].

�
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Rights.' "14

lf a question, as
In these hand-penned notes, Justice Clark asks himse
1st establishing ex
though back i n law school: "If S(upreme] C[ourt] in
Amend. is of
clusion rule was correct in saying 'the protection of the 4th
are we not
no value and might as well be stricken from the constitu tion[']
little prac
forced to conclude that except to s o me the Amend[ment] is of
Indeed,
se.
otherwi
Mapp
tical use[?]"l5 Logic compelled Clark to decide
common sense was Tom Clark's hallmar k; as he wrote, "There is no war

between the Constitution and common sense."16 The guarantees of the
fourth amendme nt clearly required corresponding procedural protection
and judicial redress. Common sense dictated that "unless the require
ments in this field are merely precatory,"17-and they certainly were

not-the available "empty remedies"18 were intolerable. Thus Justice
Clark blended research and logical reflection to craft the majority opin
ion in Mapp v. Ohio and to effect a vindication of the promise of the
fourth amendment.
As majestic a decision as Mapp once might have been, the judicial
evolution of which it is a part has n ot ceased. Only last term, six Justices

14. The quotation is from the first handwritten draft of the Mapp opinion. Id., Draft of Opin
ion, at 4 (handwritten draft), citing Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 157 (1947).
15. Archives, supra note 12, Mapp case file, Box Al15, Folder No. 7, Draft of Opinion, at 4
(handwritten draft).

16. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657.
17. Archives, supra note 1 2, Mapp case file, Box Al 15, Folder No. 7, Draft of Opinion, at S
(handwritten draft).
18. The expression "empty remedies" twice appears in the first draft of t h e Mapp opinion. The
term refers to Justice Clark's appraisal of "the other means of protection one i s afforded by legal
actions when his privacy is unlawfully invaded," listing these as "trespass, damages, protest to offi
cials, resisting force with force, prosecution in some states, etc." At first, Justice Clark summarily
dismissed these actions, w riting of them: "Admittedly, however, these are but empty remedies." He
crossed out this sentence and substituted: "Our experience, however, shows these to be empty reme
dies." Justice Clark then added, "Moreover, they stand in marked contrast t o those afforded in the
protection of other rights 'basic to a free society' [Wolf v . Colorado, 338 U . S. a t 27] such as coerced
confessions, free speech and press and religious liberty. It would hardly be fair to so discriminate in
the protection of constitutional rights." Archives, supra note 12, Mapp case file, Box Al 15. In con
trast, the final version reads:
[T]he admission of the new constitutional right by Wolf could not consistently tolerate
de �ial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence
which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold
otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. .. .
Indeed, we are aware of no restraint, similar to that rejected today, conditioning the
enforcement of any other basic constitutional right. The right to privacy, n o less important
than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the people, would stand in
marked contrast to all other rights declared as "basic to a free society." Wolf v. Colorado,
[338 U.S:l at 27. This Court has not hesitated to enforce as strictly against the States as it
does a�amst the Fe�eral G�ver�ment the rights f free speech and of a free press, the rights
?
.
to notice and to a fa1r, pubhc tnal, mcludmg,
as 1t does, the right not to be convicted by use
.
of a �?erced confession, however logically relevant it be, and without regard to its
.
rehab1hty.
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656.
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Justice Tom C. Clark

voted to carve a "good faith" exception out of

Mapp

v.

Ohio.19 I should

have preferred to see the Supreme Court enforcing the Bill of Rights.
Justice Brennan, in his dissent in Leon, speaks of "the teaching of
those Justices who first formulated the exclusionary rule."20 Again my
mind drifts back to what Tom Clark told my students.

I treasure the

voice of that humble Texan's teaching:
I couldn't understand why Wolf v. Colorado said that the
fourth amendment applied to the states, but it just didn't seem to
go all the way-in fact it was just an empty gesture, sort of like
what Chief Justice Hughes used to say: No use to have a Constitu
tion-it's pretty, got all sorts of nice fringes around it, but it
doesn't mean anything, just a piece of p aper-unless you really live
by it and enforce it. And so that's true with Mapp and the fourth
amendment.21
Insight into the background of the exclusionary rule is one of the
treasures waiting to be uncovered in the recently opened Tom Clark
archives at the University of Texas School of Law. Scholars, judges, and
students will find his collection invaluable for understanding the judicial
process.

Through his archives, Tom Clark's voice speaks to us still of

wisdom and common sense in the administration of justice.
19. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. 3424
(1984). But see Justice Clark's explanation of his Mapp opinion, responding to Justice Harlan's

criticism:
There is, of course, as in all controversial cases, ground for disagreement. I have a court
and therefore my theory at least has support. . . . [I]f the right to privacy is really so basic
as to be constitutional in rank and if it is really to be enforceable against the states (Wolf),
then we cannot carve out of the bowels [of] that right the vital part, the stuff that gives it
substance, the exclusion of evidence.
Archives, supra note 12, Letter from Tom Clark to John Harlan (May 4, 1961), reprinted in part in B.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, at 397.
20. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3433 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan concludes his dissent by
saying: "There is hope, however, that in time this or some later Court will restore these precious

freedoms to their rightful place

as

a primary protection for our citizens against overreaching official

dom." Id. at 3446. Twenty years earlier, when Mapp was first decided, Justice Brennan's initial
reaction was buoyant: "Of course you know I think this is just magnificent and wonderful. I have
not joined anything since I came with greater pleasure." Archives, supra note 12, Letter from Wil
liam Brennan to Tom Clark (May 1, 1961), reprinted in B. ScHWARTZ, supra note 10, at 395.
Justice Stevens' separate dissenting opinion in Leon also echoes earlier teaching:
Nor should we so easily concede the existence of a constitutional violation for which there
is no remedy. To do so is to convert a bill of Rights into an unenforced honor code that the
police m a y follow in their discretion. The Constitution requires more; it requires a remedy.
If the Court's new rule is to be followed, the Bill of Rights should be renamed.
Id. at 3456-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
21.

Interview, supra note 2.
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